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LAW FIRMS, GLOBAL CAPITAL,
AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
Christine Parker* & Tanina Rostain**
INTRODUCTION
Between 2001 and 2003, one of Australia’s “oldest, richest and proudest
corporations,” 1 James Hardie Industries, restructured itself into a global
corporation headquartered in the Netherlands.2 In so doing, it reduced its
tax liability. It also “separated itself” from its two original Australian
subsidiaries and the huge liabilities stemming from the business that had
been the basis for its success from 1917 up until the 1980s, but which was
also killing many of its employees and customers. 3 That business was the
manufacture and sale of the material that quite literally “built” a nation:
“fibrous asbestos cement.” 4
By the mid-1980s, the James Hardie group had already stopped
manufacturing asbestos and was focused on other businesses. 5 In 2001, it
had grown into a global corporation, with most of its business in the United
States and Europe. At least parts of the corporate group would, however,
continue to face significant asbestos liabilities in Australia for years to
* Professor, Centre for Regulatory Studies and Law Faculty, Monash University.
** Professor and Research Director, Center for the Study of the Legal Profession,
Georgetown University Law Center. The authors are grateful to Mitt Regan, Rob Rosen,
Susan Silbey, and participants at the Fordham University School of Law’s colloquium on
Globalization and the Legal Profession for helpful comments.
1. GIDEON HAIGH, ASBESTOS HOUSE: THE SECRET HISTORY OF JAMES HARDIE
INDUSTRIES, back cover (2006).
2. In 2010, James Hardie Industries Ltd. (JHIL) moved its headquarters to Ireland.
Shareholders Approve James Hardie Move from Netherlands to Ireland, NEWS.COM.AU
(June 3, 2010, 9:04 AM), http://www.news.com.au/business/breaking-news/shareholdersapprove-james-hardie-move-from-netherlands-to-ireland/story-e6frfkur-1225874842377.
The version of the James Hardie story that appears in this Article is based on a compilation
of sources. See HAIGH, supra note 1; Richard Ackland, Irresistible Charms, BUS. REV.
WKLY., Sept. 29, 2004, at 50; DAVID F. JACKSON, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY INTO THE MEDICAL RESEARCH AND COMPENSATION FOUNDATION, vol. 1 (2004),
available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/tep/45031; Elisabeth Sexton, Hardie Writhes in SelfMade Circles of Hell, THE AGE (Aug. 21, 2004), http://www.theage.com.au/
articles/2004/08/20/1092972742166.html. The Hardie episode was the basis of an earlier
case study published by one of the authors in CHRISTINE PARKER & ADRIAN EVANS, INSIDE
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 237–41 (2007).
3. See HAIGH, supra note 1, at 1–22.
4. James Hardie began its asbestos production in 1917. Id. at 18. The first known death
of a Hardie employee due to asbestos occurred in about 1961. See MATT PEACOCK, KILLER
COMPANY: JAMES HARDIE EXPOSED 49–52 (2009). The first asbestos compensation claim
was filed against James Hardie in 1939. See id. at 54.
5. See JACKSON, supra note 2, Annex J, at 117–18, 121.
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come.
James Hardie’s asbestos manufacturing business had been
enormously successful, and Australians had become the highest per capita
users of asbestos in the world. 6 One out of three domestic dwellings built
before 1982 is thought to contain asbestos. By 2001, approximately two
thousand asbestos compensation claims had been made against James
Hardie. Due to a long latency period, however, there are estimates that
asbestos-related disease in Australia will not peak until 2020, with about
13,000 cases of mesothelioma (a deadly cancer of the pleural lining of the
lungs caused only by asbestos) and 40,000 cases of other asbestos-related
lung cancer. 7
Lawyers were of course needed to construct this global corporation.
Their assignment was to formulate a series of legal transactions, designed to
ensure that upon completion, James Hardie could legitimately announce to
the market that it had “resolved” its asbestos liabilities and could now
“focus entirely on growing the company for the benefit of all
shareholders.” 8 When it later became obvious that inadequate provision
had been made for the long tail of asbestos claims against the former James
Hardie group companies—the funding provided to satisfy claims was
predicted to have a shortfall of somewhere between A$800 million and $1.5
billion—there was a large public outcry, and the legality of this
announcement was disputed.
The liability of a number of directors and officers of the James Hardie
parent for making a misleading statement with this announcement—and
hence, in one sense, the ultimate success or failure of the legal work done
by James Hardie’s lawyers—is still being determined in an appeal to the
highest court in Australia.9 In another sense, it is already clear that the
6. See id. at 117.
7. Peta Spender, Blue Asbestos & Golden Eggs: Evaluating Bankruptcy and Class
Actions as Just Responses to Mass Tort Liability, 25 SYDNEY L. REV. 223, 234 (2003).
8. See Press Release, James Hardie, James Hardie Resolves Its Asbestos
Liability.Favourably for Claimants and Shareholders (Feb. 16, 2001), in JACKSON, supra
note 2, at 29, ¶ 2.35 (announcing the creation of the Medical Research Compensation
Foundation (MRCF), an entity which would be responsible for all asbestos-related liabilities,
stating, “The Foundation has sufficient funds [through a one-time provision of funding from
the parent] to meet all legitimate compensation claims anticipated from people injured by
asbestos products that were manufactured in the past by two former subsidiaries of JHIL.”).
Commissioner David Jackson later described this announcement as “seriously misleading.”
See id. at 10, ¶ 1.15. In Commissioner Jackson’s view, the James Hardie CEO and General
Counsel had breached their duties as James Hardie officers “by encouraging the Board to act
on the Trowbridge Report in forming a view that the Foundation would be ‘fully funded.’”
See id. at 420, ¶ 24.82.
9. The Australian Securities and Investments Commission commenced civil
proceedings in relation to this matter in 2007. In 2009, the New South Wales Supreme Court
found that seven former directors, three former company officers, and the former General
Counsel of JHIL and James Hardie Industries NV (JHINV), had breached various duties
under the Corporations Act in relation to disclosures made concerning the adequacy of
funding made available in 2001 for asbestos-related litigation. See Austl. Sec. & Invs.
Comm’n v Macdonald [2009] NSWSC 287 (Austl.). In 2010, the New South Wales Court of
Appeal dismissed the appeal by JHINV, upheld the appeals by the non-executive directors,
and dismissed in part and upheld in part the appeals by the executive officers. See Morley &
Ors v Austl. Sec. & Invs. Comm’n [2010] NSWCA 331 (Austl.); Shafron v Austl. Sec. &
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lawyers failed. The legal work these lawyers so carefully did to distance
the James Hardie parent from its subsidiaries, and from any shareholder
perception that it was still tainted by large future liabilities, was all undone
when Bernie Banton (a social justice campaigner and victim of asbestosis
and mesothelioma), the unions, and the New South Wales government
succeeded in getting the parent to pay the shortfall, despite the company’s
not being legally required to do so. James Hardie fought the pressure to
cover the remaining claims kicking and screaming. 10
James Hardie’s outside lawyers were among those criticized by the
special government commission of inquiry (Commission) set up to
scrutinize James Hardie’s actions. During hearings convened to investigate
the incident, Commissioner David Jackson wondered aloud: “Why didn’t
someone stand back and say, ‘This is just too hot’?”11 He concluded in his
report that it was “disturbing” that none of Hardie’s professional advisors
and officers, especially its outside advisors, “expressed any view of the
merits [or rightness] of the underlying transaction[]” and that none of them
had informed their client that “separation was unlikely to be successful
unless the [Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (MRCF),
established to cover asbestos-related claims] was fully funded, and that this
was required to be rigorously checked.” 12 Jackson was surprised that
lawyers from Allens Arthur Robinson (Allens), a large and well-respected
corporate firm, did not raise the question of the adequacy of the funding
earlier than they did. Ultimately Jackson concluded that James Hardie’s
law firm had not engaged in intentional wrongdoing and had therefore not
breached any law or professional conduct rule, although they may have
been negligent and in breach of their duty of care to James Hardie. 13
Nevertheless he appeared to harbor some vestige of hope that a
Invs. Comm’n [2011] NSWCA 110 (Austl.). Both the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission and the two executive officers sought leave to appeal to the High Court of
Australia (the highest court in Australia). This was granted in May 2011 and arguments
were heard in October 2011. Judgment is pending at the time of this writing.
10. See Helen Anderson, Veil Piercing and Corporate Groups—An Australian
Perspective, 2010 N.Z. L. REV. 1, 7–8; Paul von Nessen & Abe Herzberg, James Hardie’s
Asbestos Liability Legacy in Australia: Disclosure, Corporate Social Responsibility and the
Power of Persuasion, 26 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1, 36 (2011) (describing the pressure that
needed to be brought to bear by the New South Wales government, unions, asbestos disease
sufferers and the general public before the James Hardie group “accepted that the desired
elimination of its asbestos legacy had been unsuccessful”). As a result of the Commission of
Inquiry, the New South Wales government threatened to legislate to make the James Hardie
group liable unless they were able to negotiate a satisfactory arrangement for compensation
of everyone. Unions threatened a boycott of James Hardie products, and James Hardie
received bad publicity from the campaigning of unions, and asbestos disease sufferers and
their families before an arrangement was finally negotiated. On December 1, 2005, the
company effectively agreed to undo its 2001–02 restructuring and reestablish its liability to
compensate victims of asbestos. See Marcus Priest, Buck Stops with New Local Unit, AUSTL.
FIN. REV., Dec. 2, 2005, at 5.
11. Elisabeth Sexton, Allens Warned on Supine Behavior, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(July 11, 2004), http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/07/11/1089484242541.html?from=
storylhs.
12. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 547–48, ¶¶ 29.14, 29.16.
13. Id. at 456, ¶ 25.91.
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corporation’s advisors, especially its lawyers, would demonstrate some
professional autonomy and ethical judgment, and would resist succumbing
to its client’s commercialism and profit-orientation. Jackson appeared to
believe that lawyers would act consistent with their ethical concerns about
their client’s activities, even when such actions were not required by
professional conduct rules.
This Article considers whether this faith in professional autonomy is
feasible or forlorn. We do not consider this question from a normative or
ethical point of view, but rather from a sociological perspective. As we
show, arguments for reform (or renewal) of the professional ethics of
commercial lawyers assume a particular sociology of the legal profession—
one that sees professionalism as a distinct set of institutional arrangements
for an ethical professional community with unique advantages over
markets, business organizations, and government bureaucracies 14—albeit
one that might be deplorably in decline.
This is in contrast to an alternative, critical sociology of the legal
profession that explains the rise of professionalism as going hand in hand
with the rise in fortunes of the business of law and of global capital itself.
Indeed, in this account, the discourse of professionalism and the business of
law are interdependent, and the relations between the profession of law and
global capital mutually constitutive.
We embark on this task with a conceit: we take as our starting point
C. Wright Mill’s humanistic vision for sociology—to educate individuals to
avoid being “falsely conscious of their social positions.” 15 Mills argues
that, while individuals often feel that the circumstances of their daily life
are their own problems alone, the “sociological imagination” connects their
personal troubles to public issues so that they can understand that their
personal problems are shared by others and can only be solved by change to
the structure of the groups and societies in which they live. 16
We begin by considering the sociology of the legal profession through
the eyes of one of James Hardie’S outside lawyers, David Robb, a junior
partner at Allens, who was on several occasions deeply disturbed by how
“hot” the deal was. The conceit we propose is that he might be interested in
using the “sociological imagination” to deal with his misgivings about
James Hardie’s actions. In order to denote when we enter the world of
speculation, we will refer to him by his initials, DR, only. In this Article,
we do not seek to explain what might motivate a lawyer in David Robb’s
situation to develop and use a sociological imagination. Our interest in this
Article is what the sociological imagination would reveal about this
situation, assuming someone is motivated to use it. 17
14. See Julia Evetts, The Sociological Analysis of Professionalism: Occupational
Change in the Modern World, 18 INT’L SOC. 395, 403–04 (2003).
15. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 5–8 (1959).
16. Id. at 171–87.
17. Some to whom we presented this Article urged us to investigate what might motivate
or drive DR to become a sociological citizen. This may be a fruitful line of inquiry, but not
one we pursue here.
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In Part I, we outline two occasions during which Robb tried,
unsuccessfully, to exercise professional autonomy. We then describe the
frustrations that could motivate someone in his position to engage the
“sociological imagination”—to reconsider his role as a lawyer and the
options available to him. In Parts II and III, we outline two alternative
sociologies of the legal profession—a sociology of expert community as the
source of professional autonomy, and a critical sociology of the discourses
of professionalism and their interdependence with the business of law—that
might enlighten our protagonist’s personal troubles, and how they would
apply to this situation.
In Part IV, we argue that while there are insights to be gained from both
sociological accounts of the predicament of contemporary commercial
lawyers like DR, it is the second version that provides a more accurate, and
therefore ultimately more empowering, version of the social milieu in
which DR finds himself enmeshed.
I. THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION AND THE LAWYER WHO FOUND HIS
PROFESSIONAL ROLE TOO “HOT” TO HANDLE
A. Too Hot to Handle?
Between February 2001 and March 2003, James Hardie’s corporate
management restructured its family of companies so that that all the group’s
asbestos liabilities would end up vested in a separate entity, the MRCF,
together with a fixed amount of funding for compensating asbestos
claims. 18 At two points during this period, David Robb attempted to raise
concerns about the adequacy of the funding.
The first occasion arose in February 2001, when Allens lawyers,
including David Robb, attended a crucial meeting at which the company’s
Board approved isolating James Hardie’S asbestos liabilities in the MRCF.
Subsequently, the foundation was cut adrift from the James Hardie group
without adequate funding to compensate all those who would be legally
entitled to compensation. During the fateful February meeting, James
Hardie’s Chief Executive Officer, Peter Macdonald, and General Counsel,
Peter Shafron, urged the Board to vote to create the MRCF. At the time,
the company’s officers permitted the Board to make its decision based on a
18. Before February 2001, the James Hardie group’s main legal responsibilities for
asbestos compensation related to claims against two subsidiary companies owned by the
parent company, JHIL. These two companies, Amaba Pty Ltd. and Amaca Pty Ltd., had
made asbestos products from 1937 until 1987 (under various names). In February 2001
JHIL transferred ownership of Amaba and Amaca to a new trust, the MRCF. They also gave
the MRCF A$293 million to meet future compensation claims. At the same time, Amaba
and Amaca indemnified JHIL for any further asbestos liabilities. See JACKSON, supra note 2,
at 8, ¶ 1.7. This meant that JHIL would not be liable in the future for asbestos-related
claims. There is controversy about the exact extent to which JHIL, as the holding company
would nevertheless have been liable in relation to the asbestos claims, since the asbestos was
produced and sold by its subsidiaries (Amaca and Amaba). But JHIL had accepted that it
had some responsibility to provide for asbestos compensation claims, at least as long as it
still owned Amaba and Amaca.
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flawed report that understated potential future claims and withheld
important data that would have given the Board a more realistic idea of the
funding the MRCF was likely to need. 19
Immediately before the meeting, David Robb discovered that the James
Hardie parent company had not provided Trowbridge, the actuarial firm
charged with calculating future liabilities, with the most recent claim
numbers to use for its calculations.20 A cautious lawyer by disposition,
Robb’s “mind began racing.” 21 He wondered how Trowbridge’s report
could be current without including the most recent figures.
Robb, a junior partner new to James Hardie’s account, phoned Shafron, a
former partner with Allens himself. Shafron assured him that the new data
would not make any difference. 22 Although Robb was dissatisfied with
Shafron’s response, he did not do the “logical thing” 23 and go directly to the
actuarial consultants. Instead he spoke to his senior partner, Peter
Cameron, and together they called Macdonald.24 During the call, Shafron
was in Macdonald’s office, and joined the conversation. Shafron simply
reiterated his earlier position, that Trowbridge had indicated that it did not
need the most recent numbers.25 Macdonald, meanwhile, assured Cameron
that the foundation would be fully funded. 26
Despite Robb and Cameron’s concerns, the outside lawyers said nothing
during the board meeting. The presence of the company’s outside counsel
at the meeting was essential to give the Board’s decision legitimacy.
During his subsequent testimony before the Commission, Shafron
commented that the Board had insisted on hearing external advice in favor
of each step in the process, and did not completely trust its internal lawyer
and the other company officers. Throughout the meeting, as the Board
discussed and then approved the transaction, the lawyers failed to voice
their concerns about relying on the Trowbridge report. Robb considered
raising the issue, but decided not to after consulting Cameron. His position
19. The Board’s decision to fund the Foundation with A$293 million was based on the
Trowbridge Report, an actuarial report, estimating the likely amount needed to cover the
James Hardie asbestos liabilities. However, this report was based on dated data and other
inaccurate methodologies, and $293 million would not be enough to pay out all of Amaba
and Amaca’s asbestos liabilities. Shafron had an updated “draft” report, and was aware of
the problems with the Trowbridge Report, but chose not to make this information available
to the Board. Allens’ lawyers advised JHIL on creating the Foundation, and raised concerns
about the Trowbridge Report’s old data, but Shafron and Macdonald asserted that the report
was adequate, and the Foundation would be sufficiently funded. See HAIGH, supra note 1, at
262–63, 269–71, 281–82.
20. Id. at 262–65.
21. See id. at 262–63 (including various notes from Robb’s own files, which had been
read during the Jackson inquiry). It is unclear whether Haigh’s account is based only on the
Jackson inquiry transcripts, or whether he interviewed Robb himself. Haigh gives a lot of
detail from Robb’s point of view; Robb has not given evidence of any of these matters in
subsequent court hearings, or publicly commented since the Jackson Inquiry.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 262.
24. Id. at 263.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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was that the Allens lawyers were present in the event questions arose. “We
were available for questions to be asked of us. No questions were asked of
us and so we did not say—we did not raise it.” 27
In subsequent months, Cameron and Robb went about creating the legal
transactions and notices necessary to implement the Board’s decision. All
the while, Robb continued to “fret that Trowbridge’s update had been
anything but up-to-date.” 28 Robb attempted on a second occasion to raise
concerns in late 2002, when James Hardie’S corporate restructuring
severing the James Hardie parent from the foundation was complete, and
the foundation was left unable to obtain further funds from the James
Hardie parent.
In the summer of 2001, six months after the MCRF had been established,
it was already apparent to its directors that it was facing a substantial
shortfall in the funds available to cover the asbestos liabilities of the James
Hardie subsidiaries, due to its initial underfunding. As the directors of the
MCRF obtained updated information on recent claims, they realized that the
original amount allocated to the foundation had been based on incomplete
claims data, and that the shortfall had been predictable at the time the
foundation had been created. Although the original agreement had
contemplated that the MCRF would cover asbestos-related claims through
the next two decades, it now looked as if the foundation would be insolvent
within nine, or even as little as four, years. 29 MCRF’s directors insisted
that James Hardie needed to contribute additional funds. In response,
James Hardie claimed that the directors were not properly managing the
Foundation and “was adamant that no further substantial funds would be
made available to the Foundation, and that it had taken all proper steps at
the establishment of the Foundation.” 30
Between October 2001 and March 2003, the James Hardie group
continued to restructure itself. To reduce the company’s tax liabilities, the
James Hardie parent group assets were transferred to a new parent company
based in Amsterdam, James Hardie Industries NV (JHINV). The former
parent company, James Hardie Industries Ltd. (JHIL) was left as a nonoperating shell company, with net assets of A$20 million. As part of the
restructuring, JHIL also issued partly paid shares to JHINV, the new Dutch
parent. These shares gave JHIL the ability to call on funds up to the value
of A$1.85 billion from JHINV, and would be available to cover the
Foundation’s shortfall if it prevailed in its claim that, under the original
agreement, the Foundation had been underfunded. 31
In the lead up to the restructuring, however, Allens and JHIL had
discussed the possibility that these partly paid shares would be cancelled at
some time in the near future. According to Commissioner Jackson, while
there was no “fixed intention” to cancel the partly paid shares at this stage,
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 269.
See id. at 281.
See id. at 295.
JACKSON, supra note 2, at 12, ¶ 1.22.
See HAIGH, supra note 1, at 284–86.
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“it was, in effect, the ‘operating assumption’ on which both management
and the Board were proceeding” that it would occur within a year or so of
the restructure. 32
The agreement between JHIL and JHINV had to be approved by the
N.S.W. Supreme Court in order to ensure that the interests of shareholders
and creditors of JHIL were protected (under N.S.W. law, this was a
“scheme of arrangement”). 33 In court, JHIL’s lawyers stated that the A$20
million and the funds available from the partly paid shares would be
available to the MRCF to meet the asbestos liabilities of JHIL’s former
subsidiaries if necessary. 34 Allens and JHIL did not mention to the court
the concerns about the MRCF’s solvency that had already been voiced, nor
the possibility that the partly paid shares would be cancelled. Permission
for the restructure was granted.
In the fall of 2002, the decision was made to cancel the partly paid shares
and sever the relationship between the two companies completely. Robb
began to fret again. He became concerned that Justice Santow, who had
approved the transaction, had been misled. Robb himself had assured
Santow that the partly paid shares would be available “at any time in the
future and from time to time.” 35 Now the shares were going to be
eliminated.
Robb was so worried that he did something completely out of the
ordinary: he drafted an unsolicited memo to the parent company’s officers
discussing the implications of having informed Santow that the shares
would be available to cover future liabilities of the company, so that these
considerations would be taken into account in the decision to cancel the
partly paid shares. Before Robb could finalize his opinion letter, he went
on vacation. He left the draft to his partners to complete.
When he came back, his unsolicited and highly unusual advice had been
changed beyond recognition. The final document reassured the James
Hardie executives that the risks of canceling the shares were minimal.
B. The Sociological Imagination and the Socially Educated Agent
At this point, let us imagine that DR, still fretting about what he could
have done differently, turns to scholarly writing on the role of the
contemporary legal professional. Vaguely remembering that first year
sociology had taught him something about how the “sociological
imagination” 36 could help him reevaluate his “private troubles” as “public
issues” with broader explanations (and perhaps solutions) than those
available inside his own individual capacity, he turns to the sociology of the
legal profession, and to socio legal writing on large law firms in particular.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 453, ¶ 25.80.
See id. at 559, ¶ 30.27.
See HAIGH, supra note 1, at 286; JACKSON, supra note 2, at 431–33, ¶¶ 25.21, 25.22.
See JACKSON, supra note 2, at 428–29, ¶ 25.16.
See generally MILLS, supra note 15.
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Some might see this as an attempt to rationalize his actions: “Society
made me do it.” But we shall interpret his attempt to find an understanding
(and perhaps an answer) in this direction more charitably—it is part of the
impulse to understand how the individual fits with his or her social milieu
and the wider society. 37
DR shows the instincts of the “reflective practitioner.” 38 He realizes that
sustainably excellent individual professional practice involves a constant
process of reflection and learning in action, in order to reframe, re-imagine,
and constantly seek to improve one’s own judgments and practices.39 DR’s
instinct tells him, however, that this is not a matter merely of reflection on,
and reframing of, his own individual practice. Rather, his situation is a
matter of the collective practices of others in his law firm, with the practices
within the client corporation, and the broader history and social structure in
which both firm lawyers and James Hardie executives are situated.
This is a good test of sociological theory: can it illuminate and provide
understanding for the individual dilemma of DR if he were willing to
engage with it? And does it provide an account that will empower DR to go
beyond understanding to action, while still recognizing the relationally
interdependent nature of individual capacity for action?
II. DEPROFESSIONALIZATION: “CAPITAL AS TEMPTER”
A. Professional Community and Professional Autonomy
DR finds a considerable “handwringing” literature in scholarly writing on
the ethics of the legal profession decrying the descent of corporate lawyers
and law firms into crass commercialism under the “temptation” of global
competition and global capital.40 In this literature, “capital is cast as the
villain, subverting the professional from the true exercise of his or her
calling. Lawyering in itself is conceived as good and pure, but as distorted
by a growing association with and dependence on big business.”41
Commercial lawyers are therefore exhorted to show ethical judgment, moral
courage, and above all, professional autonomy to reverse the moral decline
evident in their relations with clients, their relations with professional
colleagues within firms, and in their moribund attempts at professional selfregulation.

37. See id. at 8; see also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 19 (1984).
38. See generally DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER:
HOW
PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION 4–20 (1983).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 4–7 (1993); Robert W. Gordon, Portrait of a Profession in Paralysis, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 1427, 1454 (2002) (reviewing DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000)); see also infra notes 56–59 and accompanying
text.
41. Maureen Cain, The Symbol Traders, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD:
TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 15, 25 (Maureen Cain & Christine Harrington eds.,
1994).
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In reviewing this literature, DR notes that it assumes a special function
for lawyers—and professionals more generally—in modern society. In
decrying the corrupting influence that commercial values have on
professionalism, this literature implicitly opposes the moral regulation of a
professional community to the chaos and self-interest of the market—a
theme that was earlier conceptualized by Émile Durkheim in his
posthumously published essay on professional ethics. 42 This theme was
further developed by Talcott Parsons, 43 and most recently by Eliot Freidson
and others who counterpose professional interactions not only to market
logic but also to bureaucratic rationality. 44 In juxtaposing professionalism
to markets and bureaucracies, these foundational accounts of
professionalism in social theory conceptualize professionalism as an
institution that cultivates ethical responsibility, and autonomy, in a way that
these other forms of organizing work cannot do.
B. Sociology of Professional Community Beyond Market and the State:
Durkheim, Parsons, Freidson
Durkheim provided one of the best arguments for this approach in his
lectures on professional ethics. Durkheim’s thesis was that we cannot trust
market forces, or state regulation, to inculcate ethics.45 Ethics must be the
concern of sufficiently cohesive self-regulating occupations, which teach
their members to look away from their own self-interest, and rather, toward
the whole community, and thus develop the general disinterestedness on
which moral activity is based. 46
Durkheim argued that self-regulatory communities, which socialize
people into ethical behavior and discipline undesirable conduct, are the best
means to achieve the regulation necessary. According to Durkheim, this
was precisely how craft guilds have been historically organized. When
large-scale industry emerged in the nineteenth century, however, it fell
outside the guild. At the time Durkheim gave his lectures on professional
ethics and civic morals, the only remnants of the moral regulation of the
guilds were the self-regulating professional communities.
Durkheim suggested that this professional, or guild, genre of institution
be extended to the whole of economic life as a solution to the evils of
unrestrained capitalism. Under his approach, the state would sponsor and
oversee new cooperatives that would be responsible for industry regulation.
42. See generally ÉMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS xxv
(Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1958).
43. See generally id.; Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS
IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34 (1954) [hereinafter Parsons, The Professions]; Talcott Parsons,
A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra, at
370 [hereinafter Parsons, A Sociologist].
44. See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY, AND POLICY
(1994); ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001). See generally MARK
TRAVERS, THE NEW BUREAUCRACY: QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ITS CRITICS 139, 151–55
(2007).
45. See DURKHEIM, supra note 42, at 12–13.
46. See id. at 23–24.
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Durkheim argued that the state would encourage public-interest-oriented
industry regulation or co-regulation that would allow civic communities,
such as those that survived among the professions, to develop in all fields of
work. Although Durkheim emphasized the need for state regulation in
every occupation, he was mindful that such state initiatives would also play
a role in shoring up traditional professional communities, which, he
recognized, were highly vulnerable to penetration by market logic.
Durkheim did not single out professions as a special site for the
development of a public-minded ethos. Rather, he assumed that there was,
or should be, a “craft” behind all worthwhile activities in economic life, and
that in order to sustain the integrity and inherent morality of that craft, there
needed to be something akin to a professional community regulating it.
Durkheim saw his challenge as re-conceptualizing the institutions
underlying occupation-based communities of pre-industrial society to
respond to the novel demands of industrialization. For Durkheim, there was
no question of returning to historical guilds or applying traditional
professional institutions to organize spheres of work. The professions, he
recognized, were relics of a bygone age. Durkheim argued instead for the
need to adapt the features of traditional civic communities to address the
rapidly evolving conditions of post-industrial society. While often read
through a conservative lens, Durkheim was proposing that citizens engage
in a self-conscious project to re-design the institutions of the state and
society to meet new social needs. 47 As we suggest below, this type of
innovative spirit, which recognizes that social institutions need to respond
to changing historical circumstances, should animate any efforts to
refashion the institutions of law practice in a post-industrial age.
Later social theorists drew on Durkheim’s account to understand
professions as an alternative mode of occupational organization, situated
between market relations and government bureaucracy. They departed
from Durkheim in viewing certain occupations as having special expertise
that made them uniquely suited to a professional mode of organization,
based on principles of self-regulation. Applied to the legal profession, this
theory held that the state had struck an implicit bargain with the legal
profession, under which it was permitted to regulate itself. Self-regulation,
it was claimed, was necessary because it was lawyers who understood the
educational needs and workplace arrangements that were best suited to the
application of legal expertise.
The view that professions had a special occupational status was most
fully developed in the work of Talcott Parsons. For Parsons, professionals
were different from members of other occupations or markets because they
were “trained in and integrated with, a distinctive part of our cultural
tradition, having a fiduciary responsibility for its maintenance, development
and implementation.” 48 Since professions were responsible for, and learned
47. See Thomas L. Haskell, Professionalism Versus Capitalism: R.H. Tawney, Emile
Durkheim, and C.S. Peirce on the Disinterestedness of Professional Communities, in THE
AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS 180 (W. Haskell ed., 1984).
48. Parsons, A Sociologist, supra note 43, at 381.
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in, bodies of knowledge and practice of great value to society they were
entitled to regulatory prerogatives to ensure they are suitably trained and
certified to interpret, develop, improve and practically apply this tradition
for the benefit of others. 49 As Julia Evetts explained, “Parsons recognized,
and was one of the first theorists to show, how the capitalist economy, the
rational-legal social order (of Weber), and the modern professions were all
interrelated and mutually balancing in the maintenance and stability of a
fragile normative social order.” 50
More recently, Eliot Freidson has sought to rehabilitate the idea of
professionalism as a bulwark not only against the market but also against
the bureaucratic modes of organization that characterize private business
and the state. Freidson argues that the knowledge developed and applied by
professions, anchored in the exercise of discretionary judgment, continues
to be important to solving the complex social problems of our day.
According to Freidson, the monopolistic tendencies of professions—their
insistence on controlling educational and training requirements and the
organization of the workplace—are necessary conditions for the
deployment of professional expertise. Permitting professions to control the
markets for their services, Freidson suggests, will allow them to develop
forms of expertise and service orientation so that they may fruitfully
address the practical issues that are arising at the turn of the twentieth
century.
C. Applying the Sociology of Professional Community to Law
A number of sociologists of the legal profession have adopted a similar
approach to the sociology and ethics of the profession. They argue that
society through the state does, and indeed must, enter into a “social
bargain” with the legal profession in which the profession can define its
own professional expertise and maintain its own professional autonomy. In
return the legal profession takes primary responsibility, as it must, for
sustaining and advocating the integrity of the legal process and the rule of
law. 51 The state and civil society might enter into dialogue with the
profession to make adjustments to the social bargain from time to time, but
overall the value of professional community must be recognized for its role
in preserving the rule of law and the justice system. 52
The most sociologically nuanced and in-depth empirical studies of the
legal profession from this broad perspective have come from the long term
collaborative and comparative project led by Terence Halliday and Lucien
49. See id. at 372.
50. Evetts, supra note 14, at 400.
51. See generally TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE
CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 370–71 (1987); Andrew Boon, Professionalism
Under the Legal Services Act 2007, 17 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 195 (2010); Alan Paterson, SelfRegulation and the Future of the Profession, in LAW’S FUTURE(S): BRITISH LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 29 (David Hayton ed., 2000).
52. See CHRISTINE PARKER, JUST LAWYERS: REGULATION AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE 140–
73 (1999) (assessing this literature and suggesting a revision to the approach it takes, in order
to make the legal profession more accountable to broader access to justice concerns).
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Karpik to study the ways in which the legal occupations (which they call
“the legal complex” to include lawyers, judges, and others) in different
countries and globally have influenced the development of political
liberalism and the promotion of basic legal freedoms. 53 DR notes that this
strand of social theory assumes a professional mode of relations with
clients, a form of workplace organization, and a self-regulatory regime that
can be distinguished from capitalist, commercial, bureaucratic, or
hierarchical business modes of work organization. It sees “professionalism
as a normative value system in the socialization of new workers, in the
preservation and predictability of normative social order in work and
occupations, and in the maintenance and stability of a fragile normative
order in state and increasingly international markets.”54
DR appreciates the appeal of this traditional account; it was implicit, if
inchoate, in his decision to pursue law and occasionally surfaced in broad
outline as he pursued his studies and began practice. He wonders, however,
whether it continues to be viable in the early twenty-first century in the
context of corporate practice. 55 He considers relations between clients and
their lawyers, the structure of large firms, and the possibility of a robust
self-regulatory regime to determine whether they afford opportunities for
the independent expert judgments that are the mark of “professionalism.”
D. Relations with Clients
DR observes that in his relations with clients, there is not much space for
him to exercise discretionary judgment. Looking back on his experience as
a transactional lawyer, he has difficulty recalling instances when he played
a broader counseling role, or saw more senior partners assume this role.56
Clients made clear that they were not interested in such advice, and lawyers
were consequentially not eager to give it. DR also thinks back on the
pressures within the firm to develop a book of business, increase profits,

53. See generally FATES OF POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE LEGAL COMPLEX IN THE BRITISH
POST-COLONY (Terence Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 2011); FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL
FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM
(Terence Halliday et al. eds., 2007); LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL
LIBERALISM: EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTIETH
CENTURIES (Terence Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997); cf. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT
GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996); RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL (1995).
54. See Evetts, supra note 14, at 404.
55. See Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law
Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 399, 415–20 (1985).
56. See generally ROBERT NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER:
THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988); Robert Nelson, The Discovery Process
as a Circle of Blame: Institutional, Professional, and Socio-economic Factors that
Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 773 (1998); Robert Eli Rosen, Problem-Setting and Serving the
Organizational Client: Legal Diagnosis and Professional Independence, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 179 (2001); William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer
Responsibility for Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2005).
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and keep the most important clients happy. 57 This anxiety makes it difficult
to give unwelcome advice to clients. They want to hear how to do what
they want, not that they cannot.
Reading the literature on recent trends in corporate practice, DR observes
that his firm is not atypical. Increased competition for clients has created
intense pressures for lawyers to breach their duties to the court, the law, and
the wider public interest for the sake of clients. Contemporary commercial
law firm attorneys have increasingly become handmaids to (global) capital.
Firms are profit-oriented, competitive, and, in some cases, over-dependent
on a small number of powerful, rich clients. 58 Increasing external
competition among law firms to attract and retain clients may lead to law
firm cultures where at least some lawyers might feel they can only achieve
partnership, financial rewards, and social esteem by proving how
aggressively they can represent clients in litigation, or, in transactional
lawyering, by designing innovative ways to get around the law and to
protect partisan client interests.59 If mid-twentieth-century corporate
lawyers ascribed to professional ideologies tied to furthering broader social
ends, by the turn of the twenty-first century, the dominant approach was
undiluted partisanship on behalf of the client. Single-minded commitment
to furthering client interests fit well with the market and organizational
conditions of corporate practice. In the current competitive atmosphere, a
long-term client that was a steady source of substantial fees called the shots.

57. See MILTON C. REGAN, EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER
291–324 (2004); Kimberly Kirkland, Ethical Infrastructures and De Facto Ethical Norms at
Work in Large US Law Firms: The Role of Ethics Counsel, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 181, 195–98
(2008); Suzanne Le Mire, The James Hardie Case and Its Implications for the Teaching of
Ethics, in INNOVATION IN CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: EDUCATING LAWYERS FOR THE
FUTURE 25, 25–33 (Bronwyn Naylor & Ross Hyams eds., 2007); Milton C. Regan, Taxes
and Death: The Rise and Demise of an American Law Firm, in 52 STUDIES IN LAW,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY: LAW FIRMS, LEGAL CULTURE, AND LEGAL PRACTICE 107 (Austin
Sarat ed., 2010); Milton C. Regan, Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1148–49
(2005).
58. See Camille Cameron, Hired Guns and Smoking Guns: McCabe v British American
Tobacco Australia Ltd., 25 U.N.S.W. L.J. 768, 779–88 (2002); Gordon, supra note 40, at
1432; David J. Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE:
LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 94, 96–97 n.5 (Deborah L. Rhode
ed., 2000) (citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW
(1974)); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 9, 25–26 (2002); Simon, supra note 56, at 1; Eli Wald, Lawyers and Corporate
Scandals, 7 LEGAL ETHICS 54, 54–58 (2004). See generally Marc Galanter & William
Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: The Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1867 (2008); Gerard Hanlon, A Profession in Transition?—Lawyers, The
Market and Significant Others, 60 MOD. L. REV. 798 (1997).
59. See John Flood, Megalawyering in the Global Order: The Cultural, Social and
Economic Transformation of Global Legal Practice, 3 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 169, 182 (1996)
(describing lawyers in big city law firms); Doreen McBarnet, Legal Creativity: Law,
Capital and Legal Avoidance, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND
TRANSGRESSION 73, 73–84 (Maureen Cain & Christine Harrington eds., 1994); Robert Eli
Rosen, We’re All Consultants Now: How Change in Client Organizational Strategies
Influences Change in the Organization of Legal Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 639 (2002)
(describing the changing use of lawyers by clients).
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The close relations between lawyers from Allens, the in-house lawyer at
James Hardie (an ex-Allens partner) and the executive management of
James Hardie exemplified this dynamic well. Allens had done legal work
for James Hardie for over one hundred years. The in-house lawyer was
working with the CEO to manipulate the shape of the advice given by the
external lawyers (and other professional advisors). The focus was on
shareholders and the place of James Hardie in a global network of business
and shareholding, rather than on its embeddedness in the Australian
community and its responsibilities to generations of workers, homeowners
(renovators), and building occupiers who might be damaged by its products.
James Hardie’S conceptualization of its relations with its asbestos liabilities
(through the CEO and in-house lawyer) was an issue to be “risk
manage[d]” 60 through legal and actuarial strategies in order to present a
good investment to the global market.
E. Relations Within Firms
DR considers whether his law firm is organized to permit lawyers to
engage in discretionary judgment. Despite being a partnership, Allens has a
fairly robust bureaucracy; and lawyers are divided into groups with
relatively narrow subspecialties.61
Here, too, DR notes that the
organization of his firm reflects a trend. Large corporate law firms organize
and manage themselves increasingly like the large commercial firms they
represent, creating a new mentality and institutions of lawyering focused on
commercial and managerial rationality rather than value rationality and
ethical judgment. 62
Reviewing the literature, DR notes that current law firm organization is
the result of a historical trend in the last decades of the twentieth century.
During this period, law firms grew significantly and became geographically
60. See generally Robert E. Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The
Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2003). In the papers for the relevant board
meeting, the CEO was quoted as saying,
We have developed a comprehensive solution to critical issues that James Hardie
has been facing for over five years. The solution should be implemented now to
maximise improvements in shareholder value. Although the plan is not risk free, it
is recommended as providing the best outcome from the alternatives that are
possible. The objective is to position James Hardie for future growth and to
eliminate legacy issues that would otherwise continue to detract from value
creation.
HAIGH, supra note 1, at 261.
61. See ALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON, http://www.aar.com.au/index.htm (last visited Apr.
21, 2012). There is a page showing the firm’s specializations. People, ALLENS ARTHUR
ROBINSON, http://www.aar.com.au/experts/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
62. See KRONMAN, supra note 40, at 271–314; Andrew Boon, From Public Service to
Service Industry: The Impact of Socialisation and Work on the Motivations and Values of
Lawyers, 12 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 229, 252 (2005); James Faulconbridge & Daniel Muzio,
Organizational Professionalism in Globalizing Law Firms, 22 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 7, 8
(2008); Hilary Sommerlad, The Commercialisation of Law and the Enterprising Legal
Practitioner: Continuity and Change, 18 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 73, 74–77 (2011); Margaret
Thornton & Joanne Bagust, The Gender Trap: Flexible Work in Corporate Legal Practice,
45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 773, 774–77 (2007).
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dispersed. To manage these large far-flung organizations, firms imposed
bureaucratic forms of control. 63 These included setting up practice groups
with hierarchical reporting structures and assigning nonlawyers to
managerial positions. As the focus on financial returns increased, law firms
adopted controls to track individual lawyer and practice group performance,
measured by number of hours billed, revenue earned, and profitability by
partner. Over time, the meaning of professionalism “shifted from the
accumulation of incommensurable professional accomplishments to the
currency of ranking in metrics of size, profit, and income that signif[ied]
importance, success, and power and [were], at most, indirectly correlated
with achievements measured by avowed professional values.”64
Increased bureaucratization and compartmentalization narrowed the
zones within which lawyers might be able to exercise expert discretion.
Even if lawyers like DR imagined that they might want to act as
independent counselors and provide ethically grounded advice, the material
and organizational resources to do so have all but disappeared.65 In
regulating the minutiae of the delivery of professional services, hierarchical
structures have eroded the discretionary space necessary to allow their
lawyers to function as autonomous professionals. The ascendancy of
managerialism has “deprofessionalized” legal work and colonized the space
in which lawyers might otherwise have been trusted to act in contextually
appropriate ways using professional judgment and values.66
It was true that David Robb was a partner, not merely an associate, in a
law firm pyramid beholden to the bidding of senior lawyers with more
clout. 67 Nevertheless he was a very junior partner; in 2001 he had been a
63. Tanina Rostain, Self-Regulatory Authority, Markets, and the Ideology of
Professionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 169, 187 (Robert Baldwin et
al. eds., 2010). See generally Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 62, at 8; Flood, supra note
59, at 182.
64. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 58, at 1882; see also text accompanying infra
note 98.
65. David M. Brock, The Changing Professional Organization: A Review of Competing
Archetypes, 8 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 157, 157–64 (2006); Christine Parker et al., The Ethical
Infrastructure of Legal Practice in Larger Law Firms: Values, Policy and Behaviour, 31
U.N.S.W. L.J. 158, 173 (2008).
66. See TRAVERS, supra note 44, at 35–58; Sommerlad, supra note 62, at 74; Hilary
Sommerlad, The Implementation of Quality Initiatives and the New Public Management in
the Legal Aid Sector in England and Wales: Bureaucratisation, Stratification and
Surveillance, 6 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 311, 313–14 (1999) [hereinafter Sommerlad,
Implementation]; Hilary Sommerlad, Managerialism and the Legal Profession: A New
Professional Paradigm, 2 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 159, 159–85 (1995) [hereinafter Sommerlad,
Managerialism]; see also Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk
Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909, 1910–12 (2006); cf. Ashly Pinnington & Timothy Morris,
Archetype Change in Professional Organizations: Survey Evidence from Large Law Firms,
14 BRIT. J. MGMT. 85, 85–88 (2003). See generally Timothy J. Hargrave, Moral
Imagination, Collective Action, and the Achievement of Moral Outcomes, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q.
87 (2009).
67. See Lillian Corbin, How “Firm” Are Lawyers’ Perceptions of Professionalism?, 8
LEGAL ETHICS 265, 277–78 (2005); Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study
of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements,
69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 252–53 (2000); Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms:
The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 631, 665–68 (2005).
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partner for less than a year and was relatively new to the lucrative James
Hardie account. Robb knew that his fortunes within the firm presumably
depended on his billings and on keeping clients happy; even as a partner, he
was still very much part of a hierarchy.
Before the fateful board meeting of 2001, DR did not feel that he had the
authority within the firm’s reporting structure to check the actuarial figures
without consulting with his senior partner, Cameron. Cameron was
similarly constrained. Despite being there to provide independent outside
advice to the company, when a question about the adequacy of the
information provided to the Board arises, he was not emboldened to go
directly to Trowbridge, but feels compelled to work through James Hardie’s
CEO and in-house lawyer. 68
When Robb tried to provide broader ethically informed advice to alert his
client of the risks of cancelling the partially funded shares, his
memorandum was subsequently revised to shift its focus. An anodyne
version was provided to the client that contained enough discussion to
protect the law firm should the Board’s decision backfire, but reassured the
client that the path it wanted to pursue was acceptable. The memo’s
revision foreclosed the possibility of discussing the broader ramifications of
leaving the Foundation substantially underfunded. Despite being a partner,
Robb was still a cog in a much bigger law firm machine.
F. Professional Organization and Self-Regulation
At this stage in his exploration, it is clear to DR that current competitive
pressures—which have lawyers subservient to corporate client demands and
have transformed law firms into mirror images of the corporations they
represent—render it impossible for him to provide broad ethical advice to
his clients. DR is skeptical that he can counteract these trends acting alone;
his experience has shown him otherwise. He considers, however, whether
there might be some practical power in a broader conception of the
independent advisor at the level of the organized bar. Perhaps professional
regulation might be reshaped, he wonders, to give this role greater
prominence. Recognizing the need to counteract market forces, lawyers
might collectively decide to advance self-regulatory initiatives that
safeguard spheres for discretionary decision making, and shift the emphasis
from single-minded partisan norms to public minded counseling.
Surveying the landscape does not give DR much reason to be optimistic
that the organized bar will be able to use self-regulatory mechanisms to
enhance the counseling role. For one, the history of the organized bar
suggests that it has been ineffective in imposing or enforcing ethics
standards that went against lawyers’ commercial interests.
More
importantly, in recent years, DR notes, self-regulation has increasingly been
supplanted with regulation by government authorities. In some instances,
new government mandates have limited the capacity to engage in
discretionary decision making by turning professional aspirations into
68. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
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legally binding requirements and imposing specific mandates. In addition,
as the global reach of law firms expands, lawyers may be increasingly
treated as generic “service providers” under international trade
agreements. 69 With increased global competition and the assertion of
jurisdiction over corporate legal services by transnational regulators, the ties
between corporate practice and the domestic self-regulatory regimes under
which corporate lawyers had traditionally practiced are likely to weaken.
To stave off regulatory threats by external authorities and keep bar
authorities at bay as well, corporate law firms have attempted to institute
internal self-regulatory systems. 70 These have included appointing law firm
general counsel, creating opinion committees, and imposing ethical
“infrastructures.” 71 DR has some doubts about how effective these
mechanisms have been. He recalls the wake of the McCabe tobacco
litigation scandal, during the course of which firm lawyers were discovered
to have destroyed important documents that were relevant to litigation.
Large law firms and professional associations in Australia announced a
campaign for large law firms to respond by making sure they had ethics
partners in place 72—something most large law firms claimed to already
have. According to Parker’s research, however, a significant disconnect
exists between the views of law firm partners, who believe they have ethics
partners and open-door ethics policies; and the views of more junior
lawyers who are not aware of these ethics management systems within law
firms and do not feel empowered to use them. 73 To DR, self-regulation at
the firm or organized bar level does not offer a promising avenue. While a
large literature exists calling for ways to reinvigorate professional
community and self-regulation at the firm and professional level as a

69. See Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of
Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers,” 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189, 189–93;
Laurel S. Terry, GATS’ Applicability to Transnational Lawyering and Its Potential Impact
on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989, 1005–06, 1048
(2001).
70. John Flood, The Re-landscaping of the Legal Profession: Large Law Firms and
Professional Re-regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC. 507, 516–17 (2011).
71. Ethical infrastructure refers to how law firms’ formal and informal management
policies, procedures and controls, work team cultures, and habits of interaction and practice
influence and constrain ethical practice. The term “ethical infrastructure” was coined in Ted
Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the “Ethical
Infrastructure” of Law Firms, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245, 246 (1998). For further development
of this idea, see Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm
Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335 (2003); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B.
Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for
Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (2002); Parker et al., supra note 65.
72. See PARKER & EVANS, supra note 2, at 15–16, 67, 213; Cameron, supra note 58, at
793–95; Christine Parker, An Opportunity for the Ethical Maturation of the Law Firm: The
Ethical Implications of Incorporated and Listed Law Firms, in RE-AFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS
96, 111 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010).
73. See generally Christine Parker & Lyn Aitken, The Queensland “Workplace Culture
Check”: Learning from Reflection on Ethics Inside Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
399, 418–25 (2011).
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bulwark against commercialism, 74 DR doubts that attempts to resurrect
professional norms of the past are likely to succeed given the realities of
twenty-first century practice.
III. DISCOURSES OF PROFESSIONALISM: SUPPORTING THE BUSINESS
OF LAW AND THE BUSINESS OF CAPITAL
A. Critical Sociologies of Professional Work
DR searches further and finds another strand of more critical sociological
literature that explains the rise of “professionalism” as going hand in hand
with the rise in fortunes of the business of law, and of global capital itself.
As this scholarship argues, the discourse of professionalism and the
business of law are interdependent, and the relations between the profession
of law and global capital mutually constitutive.
This critique of the profession was first set out in the market control
theory developed by Magali Larson, 75 and adapted and applied by Richard
Abel 76 to the American and English legal professions. During the 1970s
and 1980s, this was the dominant sociological perspective on the
professions. This approach saw the professions as autonomous collective
organizations devoted to securing the economic and social interests of their
members by controlling entry into the profession, and competition from
within and outside the profession. Lawyers deployed the ideology of
professionalism as a discursive strategy to ground their authority to
delineate a realm of expert practice, impose educational barriers and ethical
standards and prevent competition by nonlawyers. 77 Under market control
theory, the “professional project” is a collective mobility project to gain
economic power and social status. 78 Traditional professional claims of
disinterested public service and of a social bargain mandating selfregulation form part of an ideology that justifies and obscures the social
structural inequalities caused by professionalism and inspires individual
professionals in their efforts. The profession provides a clear educational
and career path for individual members to achieve power and prestige
74. See, e.g., Parker et al., supra note 65, at 172–73; Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost:
Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273 (1998);
see also TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAWYERS,
ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER MARKET 1994–2004 (Forthcoming M.I.T. Press
2013).
75. MAGALI SAFRATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS xvi (1977).
76. See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); RICHARD L. ABEL, THE
LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1988); 1 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON
LAW WORLD (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988); 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY:
THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 22–26 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1988); 3
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 80–153 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C.
Lewis eds., 1989); PAT O’MALLEY, LAW, CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY: A SOCIOLOGY OF
AUSTRALIAN LEGAL ORDER (1983) (applying the market control theory to the legal
profession in Australia); DAVID WEISBROT, AUSTRALIAN LAWYERS (1990).
77. TERENCE J. JOHNSON, PROFESSIONS AND POWER 45 (1972).
78. LARSON, supra note 75, at xvi.

2366

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

within a tightly regulated structure that ensures, through socialization and
material and nonmaterial rewards, lawyers’ continued contributions,
deliberate or not, to the collective project and their ongoing commitment to
a unified profession. 79
With the elimination of anti-competitive barriers in the 1980s and 1990s
in the United Kingdom, United States, and Australia, and the accelerated
competition among law firms for corporate clients, the professional
monopoly account seems less apposite. DR does not feel that there is that
much insulation from competition in his job at Allens. Within the firm,
there is ruthless competition to be among the top billers, and to be put in the
best sections to work with the best (most lucrative) clients. The firm as a
whole is well aware of the imperative to compete for these lucrative clients
who can change law firms whenever they please.
Yet the discourse of “professionalism”—its claims to specialist
knowledge, to normative value and autonomy, and to the centrality of
discretionary judgments based on expertise—remains powerful. A number
of more recent sociologies of professions (each from a different theoretical
perspective) take seriously one or another of the ways that discourses of
expertise, normative value, and autonomy around claims to professionalism
are deployed to serve the goals of global capital and, more recently, neoliberal governance, and are in turn constituted and shaped by them.
Each of these critical sociologies of the professions also take seriously
the micro-sociology of professionals’ work lives. They examine what
professionals do on a day-to-day basis and seek to connect micro-level
social action with the broader social structures of the profession and its
relations with capital and the state.80
Again DR considers how these theories illuminate lawyers’ relations with
clients, with colleagues within the firm, and in terms of professional
organization and self-regulation: in each case, there is a critical story about
how professionalism is not what it makes itself out to be.
“Professionalism” does not necessarily provide the disinterested, communal
basis for ethical practice that the Durkheim/Parsons/Freidson approach
assumes. Rather, professionalism is socially constructed in order to help
achieve the interests of lawyers themselves, their clients and/or their
employers.
Achieving these insights may mean forsaking the
“professional” norms to which DR at one time aspired. But in recognizing
the ways in which professionalism is socially constructed and inevitably
tainted, there is the possibility for DR to see the ways in which his own
agency, together with others, is involved in making what the profession is
and does, and can therefore be involved in re-making what it does and what
interests it serves. Pursuing the critique of traditional professionalism,

79. Id. at 70–74.
80. On the importance of this sort of micro-macro linkage in theories of the legal
profession, see Sida Liu, Legal Profession as a Social Process: A Theory on Lawyers and
Globalization (Nov. 2011) (unpublished paper presented at Berkeley Center for the Study of
Law Fiftieth Anniversary Conference) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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moreover, provides a more realistic basis for re-thinking what
professionalism can mean.
B. Relations with Clients:
Lawyers as “Conceptive Ideologists” for Global Capital
In criticizing professionalism in corporate practice as having succumbed
to crass commercial values, the hand-wringing literature assumes that there
is an inherent positive normative value to lawyering and does not critique
the notion of professionalism itself. Maureen Cain questions this
fundamental premise. As she observes, it precludes
any serious questioning of the law as such or of the role of lawyers as
traders in legal symbols. Certainly there could be no room for a
suggestion that the relationship with capital is constitutive of lawyering.
Rather, reforms may be necessary, after which lawyering will be back on
tracks for social good. By not questioning the commodity to be purveyed
by law work, the approach reinforces the assumption that it is an obvious
and unquestionable good. 81

Cain switches the game by seeing lawyers as “traders in legal symbols”
who translate “the objectives and demands of clients into an acceptable
legal discourse” and, in doing so, “expand [and tilt] that discourse.” 82
Cain 83 argues that lawyers’ work is creative. They invent abstract
categories and relationships within which clients can achieve their
particular objectives. According to Cain, because the legal profession has
grown up with capital and largely serves capital as its clients, the law itself
is largely tilted toward the interests of capital. Professionalism and
professional autonomy were created to bolster and legitimate the law
business. 84 Through this process, lawyers were able to take the specific
interests of capital and frame them in objective universalistic terms. As
Cain further observes, “[P]rofessionalism secures the legitimacy and
‘neutrality’ of authoritative legal inventions on behalf of capital, as it makes
professional ideal discursive goers between two key configurations: capital
and the state, the economy and the polity.” 85
Applying Cain’s insight to his own experience, DR recognizes that—as a
lawyer and along with other lawyers—he is involved in constituting the
system that is causing the problem for him. A lawyer may give advice to
James Hardie that the law is clear that it can use limited liability to shield
itself from liability. But the law of limited liability and the circumstances
in which it can and cannot be used have been created by lawyers in the
course of acting on behalf of their clients and in the course of their more
general law reform work. Lawyers create corporations (and limited
liability) and schemes of arrangement, and they draft the documents and
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Cain, supra note 41, at 25–26.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
See generally SHAMIR, supra note 53.
Cain, supra note 41, at 37.
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representations that apply them to particular cases, including the James
Hardie case. It is the creative work of lawyers in the past that has created
the legal strategies that allow James Hardie to do what it now does to
“separate” itself from its liabilities. It is also this creative work and the way
it has already tilted86 the law toward the interests of a client like James
Hardie that imposes “professional” constraints on DR. Having taken on the
James Hardie representation, DR is obligated by professional norms to
represent the company to the limits of the law. If it is possible to use and
create legal strategies that defer to its wish to shed as best it can its liability
for its historical role in producing asbestos in its quest to become a global
company, then DR feels professionally constrained to do so.
At the same time, DR recognizes that James Hardie’s success was not
guaranteed by the creative work of its lawyers. Indeed, James Hardie (and
its lawyers) was called to account for its failures to abide by social
expectations that it would compensate victims of asbestos exposure. DR
further recognizes that his own role as a conceptive ideologist for capital is
not inevitable. The ultimate failure of the James Hardie scheme suggests
that there is space and resources for critical agency.
C. Relations Within Firms: Discipline and Governmentality
Cain’s analysis shows how the content and substance of the work that
lawyers do as apparently autonomous professionals is tilted toward the
interest of capital as their major clients. Recent critical scholarship in the
sociology of the professions focuses on the ways that the organization and
governance of professional work serves bureaucratic or capitalist goals.
Professionalism may appear to provide an alternative to market and
bureaucracy, as Durkheim, Parsons, and Freidson argued. This literature,
applying Foucault’s insights on discipline 87 and governmentality, 88 argues,
however, that the discourse of “professionalism” is used to govern the
conduct of those who are defined as professionals as a regulatory
Whereas Cain uncovered how
technology of self-control. 89
“professionalism” is constructed by the profession itself in order to be able
to serve capital, this Foucaultian perspective reveals the ways that the
contemporary meaning of professionalism is being reconstructed by some
86. See Timothy Kuhn, Positioning Lawyers: Discursive Resources, Professional Ethics
and Identification, 16 ORGANIZATION 681, 697 (2009) (noting the “tilt” toward orthodox
acceptance of commercialism and corporate power in the array of discursive resources about
their professional identity available to junior lawyers in a large commercial law firm).
87. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (1977).
88. See generally THOMAS LEMKE, FOUCAULT, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND CRITIQUE
(2011); THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY (Graham Burchell, Colin
Gordon & Peter Miller eds., 1991); Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing Economic Life,
19 ECON. & SOC’Y 1 (1990); Nikolas Rose, Pat O’Malley, & Marianne Valverde,
Governmentality, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 83, 83 (2006).
89. See generally Valerie Fournier, Stories of Development and Exploitation: Militant
Voices in an Enterprise Culture, 5 ORGANIZATION 55 (1998); Christopher Grey, Career As a
Project of the Self and Labor Process Discipline, 28 SOC. 479 (1994); Sommerlad, supra
note 62.
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within the profession—partners, managers, supervisors, and the human
resources managers who are entering law firms—to control other
professionals such as employee lawyers and junior partners like DR.
Evetts and Fournier apply this analysis to the experience of “new
professions” such as social service workers in government bureaucracies
and management consultants in hierarchically organized private services
firms. 90 They argue that in these occupations, employers use the discourse
of professionalism, and its association with the complex discretionary
judgment and autonomy exercised by traditional well-established
professions such as medicine and law, to motivate employees to discipline
themselves and to bring about occupational change and rationalization that
further an organization’s interests. 91 Thus the discourse of professionalism
“serves to inculcate ‘appropriate’ work identities, conducts and practices,”
and thus brings with it a “disciplinary logic which inscribes ‘autonomous’
professional practice within a network of accountability.” 92
According to Evetts, the promise that this “professionalism” will bring
the opportunity for discretion and autonomy is illusory:
[I]n most if not all organizations, the reality of professionalism that is
actually envisaged in new and existing occupations includes financial
constraints and budgetary devolution; often a reduction in personnel but a
work force which is disciplined and more highly trained and
credentialized; an enlarged and expanded work role and the need to
demonstrate the achievement of externally (and often politically) defined
targets. 93

Evetts suggests that this “organizational” professionalism—that is,
“professionalism” that is a “discourse of control” aimed at managing
workers to meet organizational goals—applies largely in the new
professions, especially in health and education where “new public
management” is common. She explains that “[i]t incorporates rational-legal
forms of decision-making, hierarchical structures of authority, the
standardization of work practices, accountability, target-setting and
performance review and is based on occupational training and
certification.” 94 Evetts further suggests that traditional “occupational
professionalism” involving trust relations between clients and professionals,
complex discretionary decision making, and control over work conditions,
continues to exist in historically well-established professions such as law
and medicine.
Evetts contrasts this discourse of “occupational
professionalism,” which she suggests continues to be created and controlled
by professionals themselves, with the discourse of “organizational”
90. Evetts, supra note 14, at 395–415; Julia Evetts, Short Note: The Sociology of
Professional Groups: New Directions, 54 CURRENT SOC. 133, 138–40 (2006); Fournier,
supra note 89, at 55–80.
91. Evetts, supra note 90, at 139.
92. Evetts, supra note 14, at 406 (citing Valerie Fournier, The Appeal to
“Professionalism” as a Disciplinary Mechanism, 47 SOC. REV. 280, 280 (1999)).
93. Evetts, supra note 14, at 408.
94. Evetts, supra note 90, at 140–41.
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professionalism, deployed as a governance mechanism by the organization
to further its interests. 95
The evidence suggests, however, that organizational professionalism has
already penetrated spheres once considered to be the bastions of
occupational professionalism. 96 In large law firms, as we have already
suggested above, there is a pervasive governmentality that has taken the
form of an exclusive focus on competition and economic profit as the
measures of value, through technologies of control such as time-based
billing (with junior lawyers often explicitly competing against each other
for billing the most hours at the highest rates for the most lucrative clients)
and profits per partner (with league tables published in financial newspapers
and the legal media showing how different firms compare). 97 As far as the
individual employee lawyer or junior partner is concerned, this rationality
of governance is felt in a series of disciplinary practices that monitor and
control the minutiae of their every working minute—or every six minutes in
the case of billing sheets. Billable hours and profits per partner become
commensurable 98 and professionalism expressed through a particular
conceptualization of the type of service the client requires.
“Professionalism” is a resource in this technology of control. The
governance of conduct is constructed through professional ethical
obligations to clients. As Sommerlad observes, “[T]he customer-service
ethic is also the main lever in the harmonization of employee interests with
those of the employer, rationalizing and legitimating a suite of demands on
labour . . .” 99 Quoting an interview subject, she notes that demands on
junior lawyers include an open-ended commitment to “take the work and
the client very seriously and absolutely kill themselves to deliver a good
service” regardless of the personal sacrifices required.100
Thus the pervasive ideology of “serving the client” and “adversarial
advocacy” as “professional” pursuits 101 combine with the disciplinary
controls of time sheets and billable hour rankings to colonize the meaning
of professionalism for junior lawyers. Sommerlad suggests that young
lawyers internalize a sense of the entrepreneurial professional self-driven by

95. Id.
96. See generally Sommerlad, supra note 62; Sommerlad, Implementation, supra note
66 (discussing managerialism and the over-regulation of legal aid practice in the United
Kingdom); Sommerlad, Managerialism, supra note 66; Hilary Sommerlad, Some Reflections
on the Relationship Between Citizenship, Access to Justice, and the Reform of Legal Aid, 31
J. L. & SOC’Y 345 (2004); Thornton & Bagust, supra note 62.
97. See Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 62; Galanter & Henderson, supra note 58;
Christine Parker & David Ruschena, The Pressures of Billable Hours: Lessons from a
Survey of Billing Practices Inside Law Firms, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
98. See Wendy Nelson Espeland & Mitchell Stevens, Commensuration as a Social
Process, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 313, 315–18 (1998).
99. See Sommerlad, supra note 62, at 86.
100. See id.
101. See PARKER & EVANS, supra note 2, at 225. See generally William H. Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29,
30–32.
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rational calculus and single-minded commitment to client interests.102
Sommerlad’s work on the recruitment practices of large commercial law
firms shows how this plays out in the selection and training of young
lawyers, including their dress, their table manners, and their ability to
engage in appropriate social chit chat, all essential to possessing the right
social capital to “serve” elite clients and fit in at the law firm. 103
Even as professionalism is constructed by supervisors as a technology of
control, the “organizational” version of professionalism (to adopt Evetts’s
term) may still be contested by lawyers who seek to deploy a more
traditional conception of professionalism as a resource to act autonomously
and engage in action that furthers justice. 104 We explore this possibility in
greater depth through a third strand of critical sociology in Part IV of this
Article.
D. Professional Self-Regulation and Organization:
Contests over Professional Expertise and Jurisdiction
Whereas a “social bargain” approach inspired by Durkheim, Parsons, and
Freidson assumes a fairly stable ethical role for the legal profession in
advancing the rule of law in society, critical sociologies of the professions
suggest that the ethical and political roles of the profession are defined in
ongoing contests within and among professions over the suitability of
different forms of expertise to solve particular problems and change over
time and place. On this view, the meaning of professionalism is the result
of complex interactions between the ambition for commercial success and
the competition to define “professional” expertise and the values or
“symbolic capital” that attach. Applying Bourdieu’s insights, Andrew
Abbott has shown that different professions construct their expertise, and
hence their professional “jurisdiction” over a particular field of work,
through competition with other professions over the applicability of their
expertise to social and personal problems. 105 The symbolic capital of each
profession—who is deemed to be an expert in a field and therefore can
profit from it—is derived from these jurisdictional contests among
professions.
A number of scholars have used a Bourdieusian lens to study the role of
lawyers in constructing and restructuring legal regimes. Pursuing this
approach, Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have investigated contests over
the discourses through which legal work and the legal field is framed in the
102. Sommerlad, supra note 62, at 74–75; see also Boon, supra note 62, at 252.
103. See Sommerlad, supra note 96; Hilary Sommerlad, Minorities, Merit, and
Misrecognition in the Globalized Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2481, 2504 (2012) see
also DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 53, at 18–19; Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, The
Economy of Legal Practice as Symbolic Market, 10 ECON. SOC.: EURO. ELECTRONIC NEWS.
8, 10–11 (2009).
104. This is what the literature cited in the previous section does. See supra notes 40, 56–
74. This “handwringing” literature in effect engages in the internal contestation over the
meaning of professionalism rather than externally observing what is going on.
105. See generally ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS (1988); PIERRE
BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE (1980).
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emerging area of international commercial arbitration.106 In the same vein,
they have explored the professional and political contests among lawyers
and economists to shape the export of neoliberal economics and human
rights laws to Latin American and Asian states, 107 and considered
competition over global legal markets between accounting and law firms. 108
Similarly, Robert Rosen’s research on the interactions among in-house
lawyers, external lawyers, and in-house corporate business managers
working to address a corporation’s legal problems demonstrates how
contests between and among these three groups end up framing situations as
involving legal problems or business problems. 109 Although Rosen does
not explicitly use Bourdieusian analysis, consistent with this approach, his
research shows that the characterization of a particular problem is fluid over
different contexts and contingent on the results of power struggles among
the different professionals serving the corporation.
In a historical study, Ronen Shamir adopts a Bourdieusian approach to
investigate the construction of elite lawyers’ professional jurisdiction
during the New Deal. Echoing Cain’s account of corporate lawyers as
conceptual ideologists for capital,110 Shamir argues that lawyers functioned
as “double agents” 111 protecting the prerogatives of capital through “their
defense of their own perceived autonomous domain.”112 Lawyers’ ability
to represent their clients “depends on the degree to which they are able to
106. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 53, at 4.
107. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS
IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE (2010); YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO
TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002). John Flood’s work on global law firms fits
well into this style of analysis, although Flood explicitly uses institutional theory rather than
Bourdieusian analysis. See generally Flood, supra note 70. For an analysis that explicitly
combines institutional theory with Abbott’s Bourdieusian style analysis of the role of
professional work in institutional change, see Roy Suddaby and Thierry Viale, Professionals
and Field-Level Change: Institutional Work and the Professional Project, 59 CURRENT SOC.
423, 425–26 (2011).
108. Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, The Confrontation Between the Big Five and Big
Law: Turf Battles and Ethical Debates as Contests for Professional Credibility, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 615, 616 (2004).
109. See generally ROBERT ELI ROSEN, LAWYERS IN CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING
(2010); Rosen, supra note 56.
110. SHAMIR, supra note 53, at 169–71. As Shamir and Cain were writing at the same
time as each other, they do not refer to each other’s work.
111. Id. at 62. Shamir cites Gordon here for this term. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ideal
and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870–
1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 53 (Gerard W.
Gawalt ed., 1984).
112. SHAMIR, supra note 53, at 171. He goes on to comment:
It was the structural bias of this autonomous system, not substantive ideological
inclinations, that created the bond between the court-centered legal system and
laissez faire capitalism. The assertion of law’s autonomy—with its ever-present
tendency to depoliticize social relations—systematically denied law’s
sociohistorical roots, the unequal social accessibility to legal remedies, the
prominence of corporate and business law in legal education, and the structural
advantages of corporate lawyers in developing areas of the law in ways that
reflected the demands and interests of their corporate clients.
Id.
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appear as guardians of the law and as experts who are responsible for
ensuring the ordered functioning of the legal system as a whole,” 113 and not
as “mere hired guns.” 114
Shamir emphasizes, however, that in defending the value of the legal
domain they controlled, lawyers were not simply advancing the interests of
their clients. Rather, in asserting the boundaries of a distinct legal field to
which they laid claim, lawyers were furthering their own collective interests
in drawing material and non-material benefits from the exercise of expert
authority. As Shamir notes, “lawyers must constantly persuade relevant
audiences—clients, legislators, state authorities, and the public at large—
that they own a distinct form of symbolic capital.” 115
Lawyers’ attempt to create symbolic capital around an apolitical expert
field, whose discourse is framed in neutral legal values, is of necessity in an
unstable relationship with their commitment to serving the demands of
capital. As Shamir shows, this strain can become visible during times of
crisis, such as the New Deal, when a competing administrative law regime
was proposed to deal with the economic and social disruption precipitated
by the stock market crash and the Great Depression. Shamir suggests that
corporate lawyers’ resistance to “the dejudicialization of the legal system,”
which was framed in terms of rule of law values, “was fueled not only by
their individual obligations to corporate clients but also by their collective
interest in arresting the tendency of the state’s legislative and administrative
apparatuses to usurp law-producing and law-controlling functions.” 116 In
arguing for the centrality of courts in the American legal system, corporate
lawyers sought to protect their own symbolic capital, which would allow
them to continue effectively to represent corporate clients while at the same
time distancing themselves from the particular interests of their clients.117
In defending the traditional American judicial system, the corporate bar
locked horns with academic lawyers whose symbolic capital was tied up
with creating and implementing novel administrative processes to address
the unprecedented problems of the day.
Shamir’s approach illuminates recent corporate ethics scandals, which
reveal a similar strain for lawyers between serving corporate interests and

113. Id. at 62.
114. Id. at 170.
115. Id. at 62–63; see also Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar
and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 80 n.13 (2006).
116. SHAMIR, supra note 53, at 171.
117. Id. at 38 (“Whenever lawyers advance a cause in the name of law their identification
with clients becomes a burden. But when they try to transcend strict legalistic arguments,
they immediately risk blurring the fragile line that separates law and politics, which at other
times they are at pains to uphold. Two basic tactics were used through which lawyers tried
to symbolically distance themselves from their clients’ causes: their rhetorical attempt to
frame arguments in the name of public good and their attempt to mobilize the formal organs
of the bar, presumably independent of client control, in order to articulate arguments in the
language of value-free legal expertise.”).
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creating symbolic capital around neutral legal expertise. 118 These scandals
exposed the instrumental purposes to which the law is put by large
corporations—often in the most public and political style in the media and
legislatures. Jackson’s criticism in the James Hardie case of the
professionals for failing to provide ethical advice can be read as suggesting
that the professions involved, and the legal profession in particular, needed
to work to shore up their symbolic capital, which had been weakened. In
the United States, Congress’s enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 119 in
response to a wave of corporate scandals in the early twenty-first century,
suggests that the corporate bar’s symbolic capital had been so diminished
that it could no longer plausibly assert the claim that it was in a position to
safeguard legal values. The statute eliminated corporate lawyers’ discretion
to address potentially fraudulent conduct by a corporate client, substituting
a mandatory reporting up scheme. 120
Further, Shamir’s analysis shows that the expertise, jurisdiction, and
symbolic capital of the legal profession is socially constructed by the
profession as a group. It is always unstable and open to strain, and it is
constructed as a result of contests both within the profession itself and in
relation to other professions, clients, governments, and the public.
Although Shamir’s approach emphasizes the contests among professional
groups, his account suggests that despite structural constraints, there may be
space to maneuver and engage in concerted action. When mobilized,
lawyers may be able to act to strengthen the symbolic capital of their
profession.
Thinking back on his experience, DR realizes that a source of his
frustration was that within the hierarchy of the firm and relations with inhouse counsel for the client, there was little opportunity for him as an
individual lawyer, a junior partner, to act to protect the symbolic capital of
the profession. The senior partners and in-house counsel with whom he
worked seemed to have a slightly greater capacity to act on behalf of the
profession to preserve its symbolic capital, but the critical sociologies of the
profession give DR little scope to see his own experience of and aspiration
toward “professionalism” as something that he can meaningfully engage
with in the context in which he works. At least one interpretation the
critical sociologies of the profession, which emphasize the structural
conditions of practice, suggests that his experience as a corporate lawyer
was mostly foreordained. Any motivation he has toward “professionalism”
is illusory. DR wonders whether the Durkheimian ideal of professional
community, despite its lack of fit with current realities, would not be a more
inspiring perspective for him to adopt in seeking ethical autonomy as a
legal professional.
118. For example, take the analyses and critiques of the role of lawyers in various
corporate ethics scandals. E.g., Cameron, supra note 58 (Tobacco litigation document
destruction case).
119. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 11, 12, 15,
18, 28, 29, and 49 U.S.C.)
120. See Rostain, supra note 63, at 189–90.
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IV. THE PROFESSIONAL AS SOCIOLOGICAL CITIZEN
The sociology of professional community appears to motivate and inspire
an ideal of ethical autonomy, but it inadequately describes the nature of the
power relations—or the power of the discourses—at work in the field of
corporate power, and is therefore unrealistic. The critical sociologies of the
legal profession, on the other hand, illuminate important aspects of DR’s
work life, but they are easily read as disempowering and dehumanizing.
They do not account for the possibility that within the micro relationships
of legal practice, DR feels some capacity to act—to write an unusual letter,
to raise awkward questions.
As DR reflects further, he begins to wonder whether he can combine both
approaches to find, in Foucaultian terms, “possibilities of resistance” in the
micropolitics of his everyday professional life. 121 This means paying
particular attention to critical sociologies of the legal profession in order to
illuminate the relationship between DR’s problem and the way power is
exercised within the specific domains he inhabits. 122 It also means
deploying the discourses of professionalism made available by the
sociology of professional community as a resource. The critique of
professionalism points out that “professionalism” was created to bolster and
justify the law business. Nevertheless, because professionalism draws on
an autonomous legal realm, it also provides resources for lawyers to act
creatively to resist and re-work power relations.
In considering this possibility, DR turns to more recent research in
regulation studies that suggests that actors can effectively use their
embedment in relationships and networks for successful problem solving.
In particular, DR considers the idea of the “sociological citizen,” which
Susan Silbey offered to describe how sociological imagination might be
used in practice to address various regulatory challenges. 123 Interested in
applying the concept to his work life, DR begins to explore the conditions
under which it might be possible for a corporate lawyer to use his or her
sociological imagination to act as a sociological citizen.
Silbey and her co-authors develop the concept of “sociological citizen” to
describe “the capacity to see relational interdependence and to use this
systemic perspective to meet occupational and professional obligations.” 124
121. See Jonathan Simon, Between Power and Knowledge: Habermas, Foucault, and the
Future of Legal Studies, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 947, 954 (1994); see also Cain, supra note
41, at 41 (“One reading of Foucault says . . . wherever there is power there is resistance; at
all points in the web of discursively constituted relations resistance is possible, changes can
be made.”).
122. See Simon, supra note 121, at 957 (1994). In discussing Foucault, Fournier
emphasizes that in his view, “subjects are not just constituted through the strategies deployed
from above” but “subjectivities, meanings and dispositions” can be “re-appropriated and
transformed; they are liable to tactual realignment in the process of being consumed from
below.” Fournier, supra note 89, at 74 (using the example of “militant” computing and
information service graduates on the “periphery” of a professional services firm).
123. See generally Susan Silbey et al., The “Sociological Citizen” Relational
Interdependence in Law and Organizations, 59 L’ANNEE SOCIOLOGIQUE 201 (2009).
124. Id. at 203.
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Contrary to Mills, Silbey argues that the capacity to think systematically
and relationally is not only available to the trained sociologist but is found
among lay persons who are able to deploy institutional resources and
engage with co-workers and colleagues to solve novel problems. As she
and her co-authors observe, “[T]he sociological citizen realizes that
whatever the current configuration of that world, it is the outcome of human
actions, connections, links among persons and things. As a consequence,
sociological citizens experience a sense of freedom to try things,
experiment, intervene in organizations and arrangements where others
would hesitate.” 125
In reflecting on the sociological citizen, DR realizes that the concept
bridges the divide between traditional accounts of professionalism, which
assume that properly educated and socialized, and under appropriate
organizational conditions, professionals can construct social institutions that
serve human needs and critical sociologies that reveal the existing power
relations that constrain human action. More broadly, the concept links
accounts of professional action based on methodological individualism—in
which lawyers are characterized as either rational market actors or
professionalized socialized experts—and those that rely on social
structure—the firm or the professional community. A sociological citizen
understands her work and herself as a “link[] in a complex web of
interactions and processes.” 126 She is able to reach beyond scripted
responsibilities precisely by understanding the relationships, links,
interdependencies, and collectivities that construct her world (and that we
might pessimistically see as constraining it). 127 At the same time, she also
understands that her social world and the scripts that frame it are
continually created and re-created by momentary as well as continuing
human relations. 128
A sociological citizen’s focus on the sociology of her situation—that is,
the social links that make up her world—therefore make it possible for her
to imagine the possibility of change because she sees dimensions of time
and space in her social world. In other words, she sees the way her social
world has been constructed over time, and the way it differs from place to
place in space. 129 As Silbey emphasizes,
Sociological citizens experience a sense of freedom to try things,
experiment and intervene in organizations and arrangements. . . . They
are enabled by the awareness of human capacity as they may be
simultaneously appreciating the constraints (on themselves and others) of
the web of embedded relationships . . . by recognizing one’s location in an
extended network of associations, a sociological citizen has an extended,
125. Id. at 203, 223.
126. Id. at 203. For a different approach to analyzing the way legal professionals utilize
their links and connections to achieve organizational goals, see EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE
COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON: THE SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION AMONG PEERS IN A
CORPORATE LAW PARTNERSHIP (2001).
127. Silbey et al., supra note 123, at 223.
128. Id. at 203.
129. Id. at 204–05.

2012]

THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION

2377

rather than constricted, set of opportunities (resources, schemas, persons)
with which to fashion solutions to local problems. 130

Silbey and her co-authors identify sociological citizens among
organizational actors who are assigned the task of devising workable
solutions to regulatory challenges. In one example, they describe “Brian
Jones,” an environmental risk manager at a research university. Brian is
assigned the task of designing a containment system for chemistry
experiments that responds to two seemingly contradictory regulatory
imperatives: the first requires researchers working with chemicals to use
large overflow containers to contain spillage; the second imposes minimum
airflow requirements within the workspace to ensure ventilation. As Silbey
and her co-authors report, none of the high-level environmental experts to
whom Brian reports takes responsibility for the problem or offers
constructive solutions. Brian, in contrast, is willing to experiment with
different materials, shapes, and approaches. After talking to colleagues and
engaging in a little bricolage, he devises a prototype for a container stand
using objects commonly found in the trash. In his willingness to draw on
organizational resources and engage in trial and error to find a solution,
Brian acts as if his mission is synonymous with the university and its
mission, in this case to pursue scientific research, while ensuring
environmental health and safety. 131
In their second example, Silbey and her co-authors describe the actions of
effective prosecutors working in the Brazilian Ministério Público. Unlike
prosecutors in the United States and Australia, these prosecutors enjoy a
broad mandate to address civil, regulatory, and criminal matters, and
significant autonomy from other branches of the state to effectuate their
mission to “protect society, democratic values, and the Constitution.”132
Although many prosecutors frame their assigned cases as “business as
usual,” occasionally a prosecutor will solve a multifaceted problem by
drawing on legal resources, professional networks, and institutional
mandates. 133 In one such instance, a prosecutor solved a problem with a
squatter settlement by inducing a petrochemical producer who had engaged
in illegal dumping to provide fencing materials to limit the spread of the
settlement and persuading the squatters to dig ditches to obtain a consistent
and much-needed water supply. In another case, this same prosecutor used
her connections to a local judge to order the transfer of squatters who had
been occupying an environmentally sensitive area to a newly completed
housing unit.
Intrigued by these descriptions, DR wonders whether he might have been
more successful at his firm if he had enlisted colleagues in the networks in
130. Id. at 223. In a similar vein, Cain argues that we must remember that discourses
“have constitutive potency but not primacy over relationships. Relationships constitute but
do not cause discursive practices. It is necessary instead to think of reciprocal constitution
and partially independent potencies.” Cain, supra note 41, at 45.
131. Silbey et al., supra note 123, at 210.
132. Id. at 210–11.
133. Id.
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which he was embedded. In writing his letter, Robb tried to behave as an
autonomous individual professional, but did not do much at all to get other
players in the situation on board with his concerns. Instead, he acted alone,
and within the normal hierarchical relationship with his own senior partner.
Sociological citizens, DR observes, draw on relationships, networks, and
organizational resources to devise solutions to seemingly intractable
problems. In order to exercise this sort of sociological action in corporate
practice, it would be necessary for a lawyer like DR not only to have the
sociological understanding and awareness of the power relations he lives
with (to be sociologically “educated,” in Mills’s language) but also to
know, understand, and be able to draw on the discourses and networks that
“overflow” the micro-hegemonies in which he works. On an organizational
level, Robb might have been successful had he been able to mobilize the
relationships within his firm. His efforts might also have benefited from
connections in the community, and with government officials, union
leaders, and even lawyers for the opposing side.134 These linkages might
have provided discursive resources to reframe the problem of James
Hardie’s asbestos liabilities to arrive at a more satisfactory solution.
As he ponders these unrealized possibilities, DR wonders whether certain
organizational settings facilitate “sociological citizenship” more than others.
He notes that in Brian’s work setting, there is a “strong culture of
collaborative decisionmaking [and] the hierarchical privileges and
constraints that often impede individual initiative are muted.” 135 The
Brazilian Ministério Público enjoys a broad mandate and is politically
independent of other government agencies. These circumstances allow
prosecutors to see “the interconnect[ed], nested relations that constitute the
social problem.” 136 As members of a professional community with a
common mission, they can share “information, experience and tactics
across cases to build both local and more general solutions.” 137
More fundamentally, DR notes, Silbey’s account of the sociological
citizens is premised on the existence of “heterogeneous processes and
modes of action” within an organization. “Sociological citizens work
among others who do the same jobs differently; the combination of
divergent approaches serves as a check on the excesses of each.”138

134. Cf. Kuhn, supra note 86, at 699.
135. Silbey et al., supra note 123, at 221.
136. Id. at 222.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 206–07. Michel Callon makes a complementary argument from the point of
view of the agent about the mechanisms by which heterogeneous networks facilitate the
agent’s ability to act autonomously:
The capacity of an agent to make autonomous choices, that is to say, to
make decisions which do not merely fall in line with the decisions made by
other agents, is not inscribed in her nature; it coincides with the morphology
of her relationships. When she finds herself at the intersection of two
networks which scarcely, if at all, overlap, the range of available options
affords her with a large margin of manoeuvre. She is even endowed with the
possibility of considering action in terms of alternative choices and her
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Delving more deeply into recent organizational literature, DR observes that
Silbey’s account resonates with David Stark’s thesis that innovation in
organizations requires “generative friction” among multiple “orders of
worth.” 139
As Stark observes, human beings are constantly confronted with
decisions
involving
incommensurable
frameworks.
“What
counts? . . . What is valuable and by what measures?” are recurring
questions in our daily lives. 140 Stark argues that innovation arises in
organizations that foster competing frameworks of valuation. Such
organizations have “heterogeneous criteria of organizational ‘goods.’” 141
Stark refers to these organizations as “heterarchies,” distinguishing their
mode of governance from “a hierarchy of command and a conceptual
Based on three workplace
hierarchy of cognitive categories.” 142
ethnographies, conducted in a machine shop in Budapest, a new media
startup in Manhattan, and an arbitrage trading room, Stark argues that
organizations that encourage their workers to engage in ongoing debates of
worth “facilitate the work of reflexive cognition.” According to Stark, the
capacity to articulate “alternative conceptions of what is valuable” is a key
adaptation for organizations to evolve to address changing circumstances.
In the case of the trading room he studies, Stark suggests that it made higher
than industry average profits, “not by access to better or timelier
information but by fostering interpretive communities in the trading
room.” 143
For Stark, as for Silbey, the resources required for organizational
innovation are material as well as discursive. Investigating an arbitrage
trading room, Stark observes that each desk is “an intensely social place.”
Desks, which specialize in different types of trades, are placed adjacent to
each other in one large room without partitions to encourage “active
Arbitrage trading requires “situated
association among desks.” 144
cognition,” which traders achieve by “drawing on the multiple sensors (both
human and instrumental) present within the room.” 145 In a similar spirit,
Brian arrives at his solution to the hood ventilation problem by first talking
to colleagues and then surveying the “offices, labs and spaces around the
university.” 146
Whereas organizations once relied on rationalization rooted in “processes
of classification,” Stark argues that this logic is being augmented, and even
faculty for arbitration is enhanced. If, however, the relations are redundant,
the agent is deprived of all ability to make choices.
Michel Callon, Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics, in
THE LAWS OF THE MARKETS 1, 9 (Michel Callon ed., 1998).
139. DAVID C. STARK, THE SENSE OF DISSONANCE: ACCOUNTS OF WORTH IN ECONOMIC
LIFE 11, 19, 220 (2009).
140. Id. at 6.
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 124.
144. Id. at 137.
145. Id. at 135.
146. Silbey et al., supra note 123, at 209.
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supplanted, by the “alternative logic” of search. Stark proposes search—
like classification, a fundamentally human activity—as an adaptive strategy
for increasingly complex organizations to deal with increasingly complex
environments and unpredictable change. Stark emphasizes that “the most
critical searches for organizations are the kinds that cannot be powered by
search engines.” 147 Search, in Stark’s sense, discovers the world only in
the process of transforming it. “In the most innovative of inquiries, there is
not something out there waiting to be found.” 148 The process of search,
Stark proposes, is grounded in “reflexive cognition.” As Stark emphasizes,
this type of cognition is not that of the solitary thinker reflecting on her
situation, nor is it an exercise involving distance or standing apart. “It is a
collective, collaborative, and sometimes conflictual social process that
occurs in a situation . . . . The situation provides the materials for reflexive
cognition not because I rise above it but because I mix it up.”149 In Stark’s
research, productive action occurs when people in organizations can
generate new ideas by recognizing and recombining elements of plural,
dissonant discourses, networks or frameworks of worth. The difficulty—
and the key—is keeping these plural resources available despite their
friction.
DR finds Stark’s conception of organizational innovation attractive, even
beguiling. Although he fully recognizes that traditional corporate firms are
not likely sites to foster innovation, he concludes that legal practice affords
multiple “orders of worth” rooted in professionalism and business. 150 He
can imagine a firm that provides the discursive and material resources to
promote creative friction among these orders and foster innovative solutions
to the novel issues of the day—maybe.
At a minimum, DR realizes that the account of law seduced by capital,
offered by the handwringing literature, is superficial and wrong in its
analysis of his “problem.” The deeper issue is the narrowing of the range of
discourses about both “business” and “professionalism” that may be
available to individual professionals to come to grips with the situations in
which they find themselves. 151 As DR sees, this impoverishment of
discursive resources is exacerbated by the structure of corporate practice
147. STARK, supra note 139, at 174.
148. Id. at 175.
149. Id. at 187.
150. Faulconbridge and Muzio use institutional theory to argue that professionals can
retain some autonomy in the interstices between managerialism, commercialism, and
professionalism. Their investigation of very large, commercial law firms based in the United
Kingdom challenged a “marked process of managerialization and commercialization
threatening and displacing traditional notions of professional autonomy and discretion.”
Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 62, at 10. Instead they found that professional law firms
were becoming “managed professional businesses” with layers of professionalism,
commercialism, and bureaucracy “sedimented” together in productive ways.
This
sedimentation included space for substantial professional autonomy, including in relation to
traditional professional ethical concerns.
151. See Rostain, supra note 63, at 188 (“Whereas lawyers had at one time invoked a
variety of professional ideologies, some of which were tied to furthering collective goods,
the dominant ideology in corporate practice has become one of undiluted partisanship.”).
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itself. If DR is serious about his concerns, DR needs to develop his own
capacities in this direction—the opportunities to draw on plural discourses
and connections. Whether these resources can be developed on an
organizational level is an open question. Moreover, there is no guarantee
that they will not be manipulated by constituencies with different
interests. 152
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the sociological understanding that will help DR is not
the first alternative simpliciter. That is, it is not a matter of whether law has
become a business or a bureaucracy as opposed to a professional
community. Rather, the issue is the narrowing of the range of social
connections and links that he and his colleagues experience in their
everyday work lives, and the consequent narrowing of ideologies and
discourses about both “business” and “professionalism” available to
individual professionals to come to grips with the situations in which they
find themselves. That problem is not one of professionalism, but of agency.
It is the diminishing opportunities for agency and structure to interact where
discourses or orders of worth are singular rather than plural and
relationships are few.

152. For example, Faulconbridge and Muzio seem to see a balancing out between
commercialism and professionalism as possible and functional. See Faulconbridge & Muzio,
supra note 62, at 10. This “balancing” approach, however, is too naïve about the power of
micro-hegemonies within law firms.

